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SUBJECT: CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN VIENNA, A SPRING
SNAPSHOT

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[1](#)B. USOSCE 84
[1](#)C. USOSCE 60
[1](#)D. USOSCE 73

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Classified By: Chief Arms Control Delegate Hugh Neighbour for reason 1.
4 (b & d).

[1](#)1. (C) Summary: The OSCE spring recess provides a useful occasion to take stock of conventional arms control work in Vienna. The crisis in CFE continues to overshadow all else. Most states continue to faithfully implement the Treaty, but the impasse over Russia's suspension of CFE implementation continues. Our Allies are increasingly restive, with Germany leading a chorus urging greater effort on the Parallel Actions Package. With only one negotiating session since July 2008, and none now scheduled, Allies are increasingly concerned this has little credibility as a "process." Skepticism is increasing on the margins that A/CFE can ever be revived or have the leverage needed to extract concessions from Russia over Georgia.

[1](#)2. (C) The Vienna Document 1999 remains the second major arms control and CSBM vehicle supervised from Vienna. Russia continues to demand a limited revision of the Vienna Document, which was revised several times in the 1990s, but has now gone unrevised for ten years. Many other delegations would welcome this as well, especially if any revision could focus on a change in the current system of quotas for evaluations and inspections that so heavily favors Russia at NATO expense. On other FSC issues, the U.S. chairs a

newly-formed informal group of participating States to develop specific proposals to further implementation of UNSCR 1540 on nonproliferation. U.S. suggestions last month in the FSC for next steps on cyber security were also favorably received; several states hope the U.S. will follow up on its ideas.

¶3. (C) The Open Skies Treaty remains a model of openness, transparency and cooperation, but the agreement needs to be updated to bring it into the digital age. The technology to fly actual missions is readily available, but consensus remains elusive due to its complexity and varying approaches.

The U.S. can take a major leadership role in guiding this process through its chairmanship of the sensors working group and in the run-up to the second Open Skies review conference to take place under U.S. Chairmanship in 2010. A separate success story is the Dayton Article IV Sub-Regional Consultative Commission (SRCC) that implements the arms control portion of the Dayton Peace Accords.

¶4. (C) In all these areas, our Allies are waiting for U.S. leadership. They look forward to learning how the new Administration approaches these problems, and how they fit in with our global arms control agenda. End summary.

Early Spring Recap from Vienna

¶5. (SBU) With the OSCE momentarily quiet for its spring recess, this cable recaps where conventional arms control in Vienna stands at this point. Reftels A through D are the reporting cables on the most recent meetings of the Joint Consultative Group on the CFE Treaty, the Forum for Security

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Cooperation, the Open Skies Plenary, and the Dayton Article IV Sub-Regional Consultative Commission respectively.

CFE Treaty: Restive Mood in JCG

¶6. (C) The mood in Vienna surrounding CFE is not positive. Allies continue to isolate Russia in the JCG and have en masse consistently called Russia out for its acts of noncompliance, such as refusal of CFE inspections and failure to provide Treaty-required data. Still, Allies do not feel that the current situation, where 29 States Parties continue to implement CFE but Russia does not, is sustainable.

¶7. (C) A growing sense of frustration is becoming apparent, and Allies have informally begun to question USDel on next steps, with Germany being the most outspoken. Although the Germans believe that the Parallel Actions Package appropriately responds to Russian concerns, in the last JCG before spring recess they asserted that the current dialogue needs assisting. Germany alleges, inter alia, the pace of U.S.-Russia negotiating meetings since the Madrid Ministerial in December 2007 has been far too slow, Russian aggression in Georgia and the U.S. change in administrations notwithstanding. Germany is receiving support on the margins from several other Allied delegations which worry that the Allied position is losing credibility. Although these delegations still publicly call on Russia to "work cooperatively on the basis of the Parallel Actions Package," privately they express a degree of sympathy when Russia complains there have been only two meetings to negotiate in almost a full year. There is a growing number of voices arguing that if high-level U.S.-Russia negotiators cannot manage to meet more often, supporting talks on technical details at lower levels elsewhere (e.g., in Vienna or at NATO) would seem to be a natural alternative.

¶8. (C) A second strain heard with increasing frequency is skepticism that the remaining Istanbul Commitments issues related to Georgia can be addressed effectively using the A/CFE process. Few in Vienna believe that A/CFE can remove

Russian tanks from the Abkhazia region of Georgia.

¶9. (C) Many Allies look forward to meeting with Washington reps during the April 28 HLTF and the May 27-28 HLTF "stocktaking" exercise. They see these events as opportunities to better understand the new Administration's approach to CFE prior to the June 10 meeting in Berlin. (Note: Although the U.S. will hold the JCG chairmanship through May 12, it is largely a technical function and offers little advantage. End note.)

FSC: Vienna Document Quotas

¶10. (SBU) Russia has repeatedly proposed revision of selected provisions in the Vienna Document 1999 (VD99), notably those on reporting "major" military activities and verification through inspection and evaluation visits. Russia insists it is not interested in "reopening" the entire document but believes it possible to selectively revise portions of VD99 without exposing the rest of it to review. Russia suggests a time limit on negotiations over revisions: if consensus were not reached by a certain date, the negotiations would cease

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and the existing provisions would remain unchanged. The current version of the document would remain in force until consensus was reached on a revision, to be formally adopted by the FSC. Russia observes that the Vienna Document was updated several times in the 1990s and asserts that it is overdue for another revision.

¶11. (SBU) Norway and Denmark have in fact already introduced proposals to increase the number of passive evaluation quotas, i.e., the number of evaluations a state is required to accept (FSC.AIAM/5/09), and to increase the number of personnel on inspection and evaluation teams (FSC.AIAM/6/09).

Russia earlier proposed several revisions of "technical aspects" of the Vienna Document, e.g., concrete parameters for a "specified area" and a single deadline for submission of defense planning information. Russia also called for entirely new CSBMs that it argues could fit within the framework of VD99, including notifications and other transparency measures for multinational rapid reaction forces and naval forces. Most delegations already have a dim view of Russia's proposed CSBM on naval forces.

¶12. (C) While there is recognition in the FSC of the dangers inherent in reopening any part of the Vienna Document, there is also some agreement that parts of it could be updated in light of changes in the security environment since the last revision in 1999. Germany is known to favor a selective approach to revision, generally along the same lines as proposed by Russia.

¶13. (C) France shares U.S. and British skepticism that VD99 is likely to be improved if opened to renegotiation and could even lose still vital provisions, e.g., those pertaining to verification, in the process. In any case, France is on record as preferring a "more global" approach to modernizing European security, presumably a reference to the Medvedev proposal for a new European security treaty.

¶14. (C) The UK has questioned whether participating States are prepared to bear the costs of the broader and more frequent verification activities anticipated by some of the proposals. The UK also shares the U.S. reluctance to invest the political capital to revise a "second order" agreement when the "most important CSBM of all," the CFE Treaty, is threatened by Russia's suspension of implementation.

¶15. (C) COMMENT: Gaining additional inspections of Russia and a more rational distribution of quotas would make sense, including added transparency while Russia suspends its implementation of CFE. Any Allied steps to revise Vienna Document 1999, however, should be structured to prevent

inadvertent signals that Allies do not expect the CFE Treaty ever to be restored to full health or that they would try to recreate CFE through a revised VD99. END COMMENT.

UNSCR 1540: Next Steps

¶16. (SBU) The U.S. has proposed additional measures at the FSC to more fully implement UNSCR 1540, including a Best Practices Guide, an exchange of information by participating States (pS) on current implementation activities, and the development of a mutual technical assistance mechanism for pS. The U.S. is also prepared to contribute funds to support

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a full-time position at the OSCE secretariat to coordinate 1540 activities. To develop specific proposals for adoption in the FSC, an "Informal Group of Friends on Nonproliferation," was formed on April 7 under U.S. chairmanship.

Small Arms/Light Weapons

¶17. (SBU) The 2008 OSCE Ministerial directed a review of the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), also handled within the FSC. Germany is taking the lead in preparing a work plan for the review that would culminate in a two-day meeting late in 2009. Many pS support closer alignment of OSCE programs on SALW and stockpiles of conventional ammunition with the UN Program of Action on SALW (UNPOA). Germany has proposed completing the SALW review in time for the next biennial meeting of states to review implementation of the UNPOA, scheduled for summer 2010.

Cyber Security: U.S. Ideas Welcome

¶18. (SBU) The FSC conducted a two-day workshop on cyber security in March 2009 that featured several U.S. presenters, including Michele Markoff, the Department's cyber policy lead, and representatives of DOD and DHS. The U.S. delegation proposed several possible next steps for the FSC: networking and training workshops; a self-survey of existing policies and practices; sharing best practices with other multinational organizations; a workshop to exchange lessons learned from exercises and identify opportunities for confidence-building exercises; publishing information requirements for an early warning network; and developing a framework using the Counter-Terrorism Network to facilitate law enforcement cooperation in tracing cyber criminals. The U.S. proposals were well-received at the workshop and several delegations have informally approached the U.S. since to urge us to introduce specific proposals in the FSC.

¶19. (C) COMMENT: A new CSBM introduced by the U.S. and close allies on cyber security would be in U.S. interest for three reasons. First, it would advance the U.S. approach with the 56 participating States of the OSCE, half of whom are not in NATO. Second, it would offer a positive alternative to impractical Russian proposals that would treat cyber security as an arms control issue and thus prevent Russia from defining the debate. Third, it would allow the U.S. to assert leadership in an area that matters to U.S. interests. Such a CSBM could be centered, for instance, around the U.S. recommendations at the workshop (see preceding para) or the G-8's eleven agreed points on cyber security. END COMMENT.

Open Skies: Good Flying Weather but Sensors Cloud Future

¶20. (SBU) The mood surrounding Open Skies in Vienna continues to be positive and collaborative. The key challenge to this agreement is to drag it into the modern age of changing technology. In February, there was a landmark Chairman's

statement that allows procurement and testing of equipment. Even so, March sub-meetings of the Informal Working Group on Sensors (IWGS), chaired by the U.S. (Scott Simmons), sought

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without success to hammer out rules that would govern, in accordance with Treaty provisions, the use of digital cameras during Open Skies Observer missions. Although Russian experts were engaged seriously, progress remains frustratingly slow due to the complexity of the discussions, which require in-depth knowledge of physics and mathematics.

¶21. (SBU) The U.S. will be chair of the second Open Skies review conference required in 2010, and began consulting informally with interested States Qties on the agenda, modalities, theme, and timing. So far, there have been no firm views other than vague recommendations that the first review conference in 2005 went well and can serve as an rough model for the second, so we have an opportunity to shape the agenda and work-plan in the coming months.

¶22. (C) COMMENT: The Mission has three areas of focus for the upcoming Open Skies session which convenes on April 27 under Bosnian chairmanship. First, to reach an OSCC decision by late June on a date and location for the second review conference in 2010. Second, to continue informal consultations to build consensus with all interested States Parties on broader expectations and recommendations for next year's review conference. Third, to encourage the Russians toward progress on digital imaging decisions. The first two areas are easy; the third, however, is far more elusive due to the technical challenges. END COMMENT.

Dayton Article IV: Don't Fix
What Isn't Broken

¶23. (SBU) The 42nd Dayton Article IV Sub-Regional Consultative Commission (SRCC), representing the Dayton Agreement Parties of Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Montenegro, met March 16-19 in Croatia (Ref D). This sub-regional CSBM, a CFE-like regime, is another success story. The meeting was cooperative and friendly, resulting in easy approval of several implementation documents that had been prepared by the Permanent Working Group.

¶24. (C) The most contentious discussions were reserved for the issue of "ownership" of Article IV responsibilities, with the four Parties seeking to avoid rapid transfer to them of technical responsibilities from the OSCE Office of the Personal Representative for Dayton Article IV ("the PR"). Close observers believe that, given the problematic political situations in Bosnia and Kosovo, there is little desire by the Parties to see any decline in international support to the Dayton Article IV regime. Last week the PR, Italian Brigadier General Costanzo Periotto, took on board the consensus view of the contact group that the ownership issue should be slow and steady. Periotto said he had also concluded that to rush the process would be a mistake.

¶25. (C) COMMENT: Given ongoing uncertainties about Bosnia and Kosovo, the apparent success of the present division of responsibilities between the Personal Representative and the Parties, and its low cost of under USD 300,000 annually, PeriottoQ right that it would be ill-advised to press a transfer of additional responsibilities onto the Parties at this time. Let's not fix what isn't broken. END COMMENT.
SCOTT